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INTRODUCTION 
Bruce Ackerman's We the People: The Civil Rights 
Revolution- the third book in what will eventually become a We 
the People quartet-is a staggering achievement. In one sense, it's 
simply a continuation of a story that he began telling decades ago, 
one that valorizes popular sovereignty and the ongoing 
constitutional creativity of the American people. 1 Although not 
generally labeled a popular constitutionalist, Ackerman was an 
important forerunner of the movement, urging scholars to look 
outside both the courts and the formal constraints of Article V to 
find the real story of constitutional change in the United States.4 
In the end, both Ackerman and his popular constitutionalist 
counterparts agree on the one big thing that matters most: the 
American people are (and ought to be) the ultimate drivers of 
constitutional change. 
In his new volume, Ackerman blesses another key era in 
American history as a period of higher lawmaking and explains, 
in something like common law fashion (p. 81 ), how the Civil 
Rights Revolution both fits with and builds upon the lessons and 
I. Sterling Professor of Law and Political Science, Yale Law School. 
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achievements of the Founding, Reconstruction, and the New Deal 
(p. 5). (Spoiler alert: The Civil Rights Revolution is a 
constitutional moment!) Of course, the pattern of higher 
lawmaking isn't precisely the same and new legal resources -like 
landmark statutes-receive greater emphasis (p. 5), but much of 
the terminology is familiar to those who have spent time with 
Ackerman's previous volumes, as is this volume's overall 
normative thrust. 
Taken at this level, The Civil Rights Revolution surely 
achieves much of what Ackerman sets out to accomplish, 
providing an illuminating, textured, and (at timleS) revisionist 
account of this key period of American history- an account that 
stands up quite well to his treatment of other constitutional 
moments in previous volumes. Notably, it's also a delight to read. 
In other words, it's pure Ackerman. 
It should come as little surprise, then, that critics have already 
lodged a familiar set of complaints against this new volume-
many of which have been recycled after the publication of each 
part of the We the People series. Some critics take dead aim at 
Ackerman's ml!ltistep process f~r ident~fying ge?uine acts of 
popular soveretgnty.· Others ~uibble with certain aspects of 
Ackerman's historical narrative.' I leave those wel1-worn paths to 
others. Instead, in this Book Review, I focus on the relationship 
between Ackerman's new volume and the theory of popular 
constitutionalism. 
The most enduring criticism of popular constitutionalism is 
that the literature offers few clues about how to make it work, 
especially as an approach to judicial decisionmaking. 7 While some 
scholars have sought to respond to these criticism:s,x a great deal 
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1602 (2005) (reviewing LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR 
CONSTITL!TION/\LISM /\NO JLJDICI/\L REVIEW (2004)). 
K See Katie Eyer, Lower Court Popular Constitutionalism, 12:?1 YALE LJ. ONLINE 
1 Y7 (2013); Mark D. Rosen & Christopher W. Schmidt, Why Broccoli? Limiting Principles 
and Popular Constitutionalism in the Health Care Case, 61 UCLA L REV. 66 (2013); Brad 
Snyder, Frankfurter and Popular Constitutionalism, 47 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 343 (2013); 
Tom Donnelly, Making Popular Constitutionalism Work, 2012 WIS. L REV. 15<} 
!hereinafter Donnelly. WorkJ. 
2015] BOOK REVIEWS 543 
of work remains to be done. To that end, popular 
constitutionalists should pay close attention to the parts of 
Ackerman's new volume devoted to constitutional interpretation. 
While previous volumes have provided glimpses of how 
Ackerman's approach might work, The Civil Rights Revolution 
provides even fuller treatment of this issue. In short, Ackerman's 
new volume should serve as the starting point for any robust 
account of (what I refer to as) judicial popular constitutionalism. 
In this Book Review, I seek to offer an approach to popular 
constitutional analysis that keeps faith with Larry Kramer's 
groundbreaking scholarship, while also remaining as consistent as 
possible with the role that public opinion already plays in judicial 
decisionmaking. My goal here isn't to argue that judicial popular 
constitutionalism is the best approach to constitutional analysis. 
Instead, I simply wish to explore whether a coherent approach is 
even possible, and, if so, to begin to sketch what it might look like. 
This Book Review proceeds in three Parts. Part I provides a 
general overview of Ackerman's new volume, situating it within 
the framework of his entire We the People series. Part II uses 
Ackerman's insights about constitutional interpretation to sketch 
a preliminary account of judicial popular constitutionalism. Part 
III uses the issue of marriage equality to demonstrate how judicial 
popular constitutionalism might work. 
I. ACKERMAN'S THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONAL 
CHANGE AND THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION 
Bruce Ackerman's big idea is that popular sovereignty is 
(and ought to be) the driver of constitutional change within our 
system. The main challenge for constitutional theorists and, more 
importantly, for judges, is to identify when the American people 
have spoken (p. 32-47). For Ackerman, the answer lies in "a 
reflective study of the past. " 9 
In Ackerman's view, American history teaches a simple, but 
profound lesson. When the American people speak, our tradition 
permits them to shatter conventional legal barriers and change 
our constitutional baselines-whether by establishing a new 
constitution (e.g., the Founding), re-founding our republic 
through transformative amendments (e.g., Reconstruction), or 
reshaping foundational ideas without altering the words of the 
9. ACKERMAN, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 3, at 17. 
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Constitution (e.g., the New Deal) (p. 3). For Ackerman, this is the 
very core of the American constitutional tradition .. 
To promote legitimate constitutional change, each 
constitutional proposal must traverse a multistep, multiyear 
process, which includes a series of public debates, political fights, 
elections, and court battles (pp. 44-47). However, if the new 
proposal survives this process- if its adherents win a series of 
political victories, if its opponents acquiesce, and if the judiciary 
codifies the new constitutional understanding in transformative 
decisions- the proposal earns the right to alter our constitutional 
order (p. 42). This is what Ackerman means by his famous label, 
"constitutional moment" (p. 43-47). It's not really a moment at 
all, but a series of tests that a new set of constitutional 
revolutionaries must pass in order to earn the right to speak for 
the American people (p. 51). 
Ackerman introduces and develops these ideas in two 
previous volumes, We the People: Foundations and We the People: 
Transformations. 10 In his new volume- We the People: The Civil 
Rights Revolution-Ackerman puts the achievements of the Civil 
Rights Era to the test. 
A. ACKERMAN'S CIVIL RIGHTS STORY 
Ackerman's civil rights story begins with Brown v. Board of 
Education. In his account, this landmark decision defines a new 
constitutional baseline- the "anti-humiliation principle"- and 
signals the beginning of a new period of sustained constitutional 
debate over the meaning of equality (pp. 128-129, 137-143, 307-
310). In this sense, the Civil Rights Revolution differs from 
Ackerman's three previous constitutional moments-the 
Founding, Reconstruction, and the New Deal-all of which were 
initiated, not by the judiciary, but by political leaders of varying 
stripes (p. 5). Nevertheless, constitutional leadership during the 
Civil Rights Revolution soon passes from the Warren Court to the 
elected branches-and, ultimately, to the American people. 
With the Brown decision and the rise of the civil rights 
movement, the American people soon awake from their civic 
slumber. Suddenly, neither the President nor Congress can safely 
ignore the legacy of Jim Crow and the civil rights movement's 
push for a new vision of equality. Instead, all three branches work 
10. See 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS (199X) 
!hereinafter ACKERMAN, TRANSFORMATIONS!; ACKERMAN, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 
3. 
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together to extend Brown's anti-humiliation principle from public 
education to other spheres like voting and housing, endorsing a 
vision of equality that differs greatly from the one that the 
American people inherited from Reconstruction (pp. 222-223). 
Ackerman's post-Brown narrative begins with President 
Johnson and Congress. Johnson works with congressional leaders 
to push through the Civil Rights Act of 1964, blowing past the 
limits set by the state-action doctrine and requiring an end to 
private discrimination in the workplace and in various public 
settings like hotels, restaurants, and theaters (pp. 175-176, 223). 
Johnson then wins a landslide victory over Barry Goldwater, an 
election that engages the American public and provides them with 
a clear choice on the issue of civil rights (pp. 6, 41, 72-X4). And, 
finally, Johnson puts his broad electoral mandate to the test, 
working with Congress to pass additional landmark statutes-
including the Voting Rights Act of 1965 and the Fair Housing Act 
of 1968-statutes that codify the new constitutional 
understanding of equality endorsed by the American people (pp. 
5, 92-95, 120-121, 200-210). 
From there, the Warren Court translates this new 
constitutional understanding into doctrine through a series of 
transformative opinions. While supporters of the old 
constitutional regime rely upon well-established case law to 
challenge the new landmark statutes in court, Chief Justice 
Warren and his colleagues turn aside each of these challenges. In 
the process, the Warren Court joins the civil rights movement and 
its supporters in recognizing an increased role for the federal 
government in securing equality (pp. 13, 121, 313-315). 
Finally, Ackerman's civil rights narrative ends with the most 
unlikely of heroes, Richard Nixon. For Ackerman, Nixon plays a 
key role in consolidating the gains made by President Johnson, his 
congressional allies, and the Warren Court. During the 1968 
election, Nixon largely embraces the emerging bipartisan 
consensus on civil rights. Furthermore, as president, he signs new 
laws and supports new administrative actions that both 
supplement and strengthen the Civil Rights Era's landmark 
statutes (pp. 6, 241-252). 11 According to Ackerman, by supporting 
the core of the "New Deal-Civil Rights regime," Nixon gives "it a 
bipartisan basis that place[ s] its legitimacy beyond serious 
11. Ackerman calls such administrative action "government hy numhcrs," a form of 
administrative constitutionalism (pp. 155, 199). 
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question"- the final step on the path from mere constitutional 
proposal to fully realized constitutional moment (p. 6). 
B. HEEDING THE CALL OF "WE THE PEOPLE": A.CKERMAN'S 
APPROACH TO CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 
In this Book Review, I'm interested in exploring the lessons 
that Ackermanian constitutional interpretation holds for popular 
constitutionalists. To that end, I attempt in this Section to 
deconstruct Ackerman's approach to constitutional 
interpretation, disaggregating it into its component steps. While 
Ackerman doesn't present his account in quite this way- indeed, 
we must await his next volume, We the People: Interpretations, for 
his full-blown theory of constitutional interpretation (p. 336)- I 
believe that the description thar follows generally tracks with 
what he's written about constitutional interpretation so far and is 
faithful to the overall normative thrust of his We the People series. 
From the perspective of popular constitutionalism, 
Ackerman gets the big things right. Constitutional change ought 
to be driven by the American people. Courts ought to be bound 
by genuine acts of popular sovereignty even if they don't satisfy 
Article V. Judicial review ought to, at its core, promote the 
considered judgments of the American people. Furthermore, 
some of the details of his approach also offer concrete clues for 
how judicial popular constitutionalism might work. 
Within Ackerman's system, the constitutional interpreter 
must first identify when the American people have spoken (p. 
337). Indeed, the very core of Ackerman's approach to 
constitutional interpretation is concerned with distinguishing 
between genuine acts of popular sovereignty-when "We the 
People" have spoken- and normal acts of everyday politics. The 
former are infused with constitutional importance, the latter not 
so much. This is where Ackerman's famous theory of 
constitutional moments comes in. To serve as a catalyst for 
legitimate constitutional change, a given movement and its 
proposal must run Ackerman's gauntlet (the multistep, multiyear 
process discussed in Part I, supra) and secure the American 
people's "broad" and "sustained" support (p. 224). However, 
even when a proposal has survived this process and the interpreter 
has gone on to identify it as a genuine act of popular sovereignty, 
that's only the beginning of Ackerman's process of constitutional 
interpretation. 
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Second, the constitutional interpreter must determine how 
the American people have spoken. To decide constitutional cases, 
judges traditionally draw upon some mix of constitutional text, 
history, structure, doctrine, and (at times) prudential concerns. 12 
Ackerman urges the constitutional interpreter to privilege 
whichever constitutional materials best capture the commitments 
made by the American people-whether that's a piece of 
constitutional text, a transformative Supreme Court decision, a 
landmark statute, or an important political speech (pp. 28-33, 
317). These materials are what Ackerman has in mind when he 
talks about the "legal canon." For instance, to capture the 
commitments of the Civil Rights Revolution, the faithful 
interpreter must heed the words and deeds of Martin Luther 
King, Jr., Lyndon Johnson, Hubert Humphrey, and Everett 
Dirksen- not just those of the Warren Court and those endorsed 
by the Article V amendment process (p. 7). 
Third, the constitutional interpreter must determine what the 
American people have actually said. The task here is to parse the 
materials identified in the previous step and determine the key 
constitutional principles endorsed by the American people. When 
the faithful interpreter tends to these canonical sources, certain 
foundational principles emerge- in the case of the Civil Rights 
Revolution, principles like the "eradication of institutionalized 
humiliation" and "equal treatment in public accommodations" (p. 
224). These principles should serve as important reference points 
when analyzing specific constitutional controversies-reference 
points that may only be superseded by successful constitutional 
revolutions (pp. 33, 225, 317). 
Finally, the constitutional interpreter must seek to synthesize 
the constitutional principles of the most recent revolution with 
those of our constitutional past-preserving some old principles 
and either altering or disposing of others (p. 336). Ackerman 
refers to this interpretive task as intergenerational synthesis (p. 
336). 13 For instance, the Civil Rights Revolution is only our most 
recent constitutional moment, but the achievements of previous 
generations remain. It is the lawyer's (and judge's) task to "fit" 
any new principles endorsed by the American people into a 
"larger pattern of constitutional development" (p. 1). Some new 
principles (like ending discrimination by private businesses) will 
12. See PHILIP BOBBI'TT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 
(19X2). 
13. See also Bruce Ackerman, De-Schooling Constitutional Law, 123 YALE L.J. 3104, 
3122 (2014) !hereinafter Ackerman, De-Schooling!. 
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supersede old ones (like the state-action doctrine), while other 
traditional understandings will remain unscathed (p. 336). 
Importantly, Ackerman reserves a key role for lawyers and 
judges-and their professional judgment-in working out these 
problems on a case-by-case basis, as the principles endorsed by 
different generations combine to address the constitutional 
problems of today (p. 336). 
In the end, Ackerman's account provides several clues for 
how judicial popular constitutionalism might work. 
II. POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY, CONSTITlJTIONAL 
INTERPRETATION, AND THE POSSIBILITY OF 
JUDICIAL POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM 
Since popular constitutionalism's inception, critics have 
attacked it as an elusive concept-one lacking a precise definition 
or a discernible core. 14 This is especially true in the context of 
constitutional interpretation. 15 While some scholars have begun to 
respond to these criticisms, 16 there's little use in denying that these 
critics have hit upon a serious problem. The question is whether 
it's somehow fatal to the entire project. I think not. 
As I have explained elsewhere, despite disagreements over 
methodology, constitutional history, and specific prescriptions, 
popular constitutionalists do share one key attribute, a populist 
sensibility- a common belief that the American people should 
play an ongoing role in shaping contemporary constitutional 
meaning.' 7 Furthermore, with respect to constitutional 
interpretation, in particular-an area that popular 
constitutionalists have largely neglected- Ackerman's new 
volume offers several clues for how judicial popular 
constitutionalism might work. 
Of course, popular constitutionalism itself is often associated 
with the anti-court attacks of its most famous proponents-
whether in the form of diatribes against judicial supremacy, praise 
14. See Scrota, supra note 7, at 1646; Keith Wcrhan, Popular Constitutionalism, 
Ancient and Modern, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 65,67 (2012); Alexander & Solum, supra note 
7, at 1602; Erwin Chcmcrinsky, In Defense of Judicial Review: The Perils of Popular 
Constitutionalism, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 673, 676. 
15. See EI-Haj, supra note 7, at 1309, 1316; Scrota, supra note 7, at 1659; Richard 
Primus, Public Consensus as Constitutional Authority, 7X GEO. WASil. L. REV. 1207, 1214 
(2010); Suzanna Sherry, Putting the Law Back in Constitutional Law, 25 CONST. 
COMMENT. 461,463 (2009); Alexander & Solum, supra note 7, at 1621-22. 
16. See Eyer, supra note X; Rosen & Schmidt, supra note X; Snyder, supra note X; 
Donnelly, Work, supra note X. 
17. See Donnelly, Work, supra note X, at 161--62. 
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for court-curbing measures like ~urisdiction-stripping, or calls to 
end judicial review altogether. x Therefore, the very idea of 
judicial popular constitutionalism may, at first, sound 
oxymoronic. Wasn't the whole idea of popular 
constitutionalism-at least as envisioned by Larry Kramer, its 
Founding Father-to address the problem of judicial supremacy? 
If so, shouldn't popular constitutionalists try to reduce the role of 
judges in our constitutional system? Not necessarily. 
To be sure, Kramer's account is rooted in an anti-court 
attitude shaped by a certain reading of American history. 19 
However, even as Kramer calls upon the American people and 
their elected representatives to curb an elitist Supreme Court, he 
still leaves a large role for judges within his system. 
Stripped of its anti-court rhetoric and court-curbing 
prescriptions, Kramer's account is fundamentally concerned with 
promoting a system of deliberative democracy-one guided not 
by "the fleeting passions . . . of the moment," but by the 
considered views of the American people. 20 Within this system, 
each branch of government is tasked with "slow[ing] down" our 
political process. 21 In the case of constitutional disputes, in 
particular, this is meant "to force the kind of public debate needed 
for 'the reason of the society' to emerge. " 22 And once that 
"reason" emerges- once the American people reach a considered 
judgment about a given constitutional issue- that judgment is 
decisive. 
Importantly, the judiciary remains a key part of this process, 
empowered to enforce such judgments and, in turn, check 
unconstitutional acts by the President, Congress, and the states. 
However, Kramer offers few clues about how judges should go 
about deciding individual cases. For those seeking to keep faith 
with Kramer's groundbreaking account, perhaps the best clue lies 
in his overall normative vision for our constitutional system, a 
system where "questions of constitutional interpretation" are 
"authoritatively settled only by 'the people"' 23 and even the 
Supreme Court "yield[ s] to" their "judgments about what the 
lK See Snyder, supra note X, at 347. 
ll.l. See LARRY D. KRAMER, TilE PEOPU· THEMSELVES: POPULAR 
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 22l.l (2004). 
20. Larry D. Kramer, "The Interest of the Man": James Madison, Popular 
Constitutionalism, and the Theory of Deliberative Democracy, 41 VAL. U. L. REV. 61)7, 730 
(2006). 
21. /d. at 733. 
22. !d. at 736. 
23. KRAMER, supra note ll.l, at 31. 
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Constitution means." 24 It is precisely this vision that guides the 
account of judicial popular constitutionalism that follows. 
A. JUDICIAL POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AS A RULE OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION 
Both Ackermanian constitutional interpretation and judicial 
popular constitutionalism begin with a shared prerr1ise. Whenever 
the American people speak, judges should lis1ten. However, 
whereas Ackerman limits periods of genuine popular sovereignty 
to a few pivotal decades in American history -leaving it up to 
judges to elaborate on their deeper meaning during long stretches 
of constitutional silence-a popular constitutionalist may be open 
to following the commands of the American people on a more 
consistent basis. Sometimes these constitutional commands will 
be profound, requiring genuine transformations like those 
following from the New Deal and the Civil Rights Revolution. 
Other times, they may lead to smaller-scale changes, like the 
recognition of a new constitutional right or the disposal of an 
outdated line of precedent. Either way, the Arr1erican people 
remain the popular constitutionalist's lodestar- the 
constitutional text that they ratify, the constitutional 
revolutionaries that they endorse, and the new constitutional 
understandings that they reach. 
While the Constitution's text answers some of the popular 
constitutionalist's questions (e.g., whether a 29-year-old may be 
President), the text alone fails to resolve many others. This is 
especially true of "abstract, general, and vague" pieces of text like 
"due process of law" and "the privileges or immuniities of citizens 
of the United States" -indeed, the very phrases and passages on 
which the most important constitutional questions often turn. 25 
As I envision it, judicial popular constitutionalism may be 
understood as a rule of constitutional construction- one that the 
committed popular constitutionalist may apply whenever the 
Constitution's text is vague or irreducibly ambiguous. 2h Put 
24. !d. at 247--4X. 
25. Lawrence B. Solum, The Interpretation-Construction Distinction, 27 CONST. 
COMMENT. 95, lOX (2010). 
26. Here, I'm borrowing from the familiar distinction hetween interpretation and 
construction advanced hy scholars like Lawrence Solum, Keith Whittington, Randy 
Barnett, and Jack Balkin, among others. See JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING 0RIGINALISM 
(2011 ); KEITH E. WHIITINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION: DIVIDED POWERS 
AND CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING (1999); Lawrence l3. Solum, Incorporation and 
Origina!ist Theory, IX J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 409 (2009); Lawrence B. Solum, 
Originalism and Constitutional Construction, X2 FORDHAM L. REV. 453 (2013); Solum, 
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simply, when the semantic meaning of the Constitution's text is 
clear, it ought to control even the committed popular 
constitutionalist. However, when that meaning is unclear and the 
American people have reached a considered judgment about how 
best to give that text life, the popular constitutionalist should 
grant considerable weight to that judgment as a default rule. 27 
When I refer to the American people's "considered" views or 
judgments, I mean something approaching a deep, durable, 
sustained consensus on a given constitutional issue-one that's 
the product of widespread public deliberation and, in turn, signals 
a certain amount of individual-level reflection by the average 
citizen. 
While this general rule is simple enough to state, the practical 
challenges of applying it are considerable. Public ignorance runs 
high, 2x and public consensus is rare. 2<) And even when such a 
consensus is possible, how should we define it? Should we look to 
polling data, the political rhetoric of our major parties, social 
movement activism, the laws on the books, recent election 
returns, or some other talismanic source? Should we require 
evidence of super-majority support for a given position or a mere 
majority? 30 Should our approach differ for different constitutional 
provisions,:" and when, if ever, should public consensus yield to an 
supra note 25; Keith E. Whittington, Originalism: A Critical Introduction, X2 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 375 (2013). As Solum explains, vagueness ''refers to the existence of borderline cases: 
a term is vague if there are cases where the term might or might not apply"- for example, 
the descriptor "tall." Solum, supra note 25, at tJX. Ambiguity refers to a situation in which 
a word "has more than one sense." /d. at tJ7-tJX. For instance, "cool" can mean "low 
temperature" or "hip or stylish." /d. at tJ7. 
27. See Solum, supra note 25, at 104-05; Solum, supra note 26, at 43X; Whittington, 
supra note 26, at 404. 
2K See Alexander & Solum, supra note 7, at 1625; Serota, supra note 7, at 1656--5(); 
Ilya Somin & Sanford Levinson, Debate, Democracy, Political Ignorance, and 
Constitutional Reform, 157 U. PA. L. REV. ONLINE 23tJ, 240-41 (200tJ), http://www 
.pennlawreview.com/online/157-lJ-Pa-L-Rev-PENNumhra-23tJ.pdf; . But see Jamal 
Greene, Nathaniel Persily & Stephen Ansolahehere, Profiling Originalism, 111 COLUM. 
L. REV. 356,361 (2011) (concluding hased on empirical research that the American puhlic 
may "have nontrivial levels of legal and political knowledge"). 
2tJ. See Richard L. Hasen, Political Dysfunction and Constitutional Change, 61 
DRAKE L. REV. tJXtJ, tJtJ2-tJ3 (2013); Richard Primus, Double-Consciousness in 
Constitutional Adjudication, 13 REV. CON ST. STUD. 1, X (2007) I hereinafter Primus, 
Double-Consciousness!; Primus, supra note 15, at 120tJ. When there is no puhlic consensus, 
the popular constitutionalist may turn to other modalities of constitutional analysis, or she 
may simply resort to judicial restraint as a secondary rule of constitutional construction, 
one that might serve as the next hest proxy for the constitutional views of the American 
people. 
30. See Akhil Reed Amar, America's Lived Constitution, 120 YALE L.J. 1734, 1777-
X2 (2011 ). 
31. There may he certain provisions that the committed popular constitutionalist 
excludes from popular constitutional analysis. See David A. Strauss, The Modernizing 
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individual interpreter's own sense of fairness and good social 
policy? 32 And finally, are judges even competent to decipher the 
public's constitutional views in the first place, or should we simply 
call upon them to defer to the elected branches as the soundest 
way of combating judicial supremacy and respecting popular 
sovereignty? 33 
These are vexing questions, and different popular 
constitutionalists with different sensibilities may answer them 
differently. For now, I'm not interested in adjudicating all of these 
intramural disputes. Instead, my goal in this Book Review is to 
build a useful framework for channeling ongoing disputes 
between committed popular constitutionalists (and their critics) 
over the feasibility, desirability, and administrability of judicial 
popular constitutionalism-drawing upon Ackerman's account of 
constitutional interpretation throughout as a useful guide and foil. 
Before I begin to develop this account, a couple of caveats. 
First, I recognize that judicial popular constitutionalism is in 
tension with traditional conceptions of judicial review as a 
safeguard against majoritarian tyranny. As a result, there may be 
certain constitutional provisions worth excluding from popular 
constitutional analysis-in particular, minority-protective 
provisions like the First Amendment. Second, the committed 
popular constitutionalist must remain sensitive to the danger of 
false positives-perhaps because key indicators of public opinion 
are merely the product of either an inattentive public or the 
actions of elected officials without a genuine popular mandate.34 
Mission of Judicial Review, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. H5Y, Y01 (200Y) (providing the First 
Amendment as an example). Furthermore, there may he certain provisions that arc more 
populist in nature, such as the Eighth Amendment's han on "cruel and unusual 
punishment," the Ninth Amendment's protection of rights "retained hy the people," or 
the Fourteenth Amendment's Privileges or Immunities Clause. See Amar, supra note 30, 
at 1762---63. 
32. See DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION 3X (201 0). 
33. See J. HARVIE WILKINSON Ill, COSMIC CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY: WHY 
AMERICANS ARE LOSING THEIR INALIENABLE RIGHT TO SELF-GOVERNANCE 22 (2012); 
Strauss, supra note 31, at XY3; Primus, Double-Consciousness, supra note 2Y, at H; Cass R. 
Sunstcin, Second Amendment Minima/ism: Heller as Griswold, 122 HARV. L. REV. 246, 
267 (200X). 
34. Ackerman warns against this danger in his account of "normal politics." 
Ackerman's theory is a response to two related insights in The Federalist. First, and most 
importantly, "the ultimate authority" in the American constitutional system "resides in the 
people alone." THE FEDERALIST No. 46, at 315 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke cd., 
I %1 ). Second, "I tlhc rcprcscnlalivcs of the people ... seem sometimes to fancy that they 
arc the people themselves." THE FEDERALIST No. 71, al 4X3-X4 (Alexander Hamilton) 
(Jacoh E. Cooke cd., 1%1). With these insights in mind, Ackerman's system is an attempt 
to distinguish between decisions made "hy the American people" (in Limes of "higher 
lawmaking") and those made "hy their government" (in times of "normal lawmaking"). 
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Ackerman's demanding rule of recognition guards against this 
danger. If the committed popular constitutionalist wishes to craft 
a more lenient rule, she must develop similar safeguards. 
B. JUDICIAL POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM: REJECTING THE 
EASY ANSWERS 
As a starting point, the committed popular constitutionalist 
should reject two possible approaches-simple judicial restraint 
and traditional living constitutionalism. 
1. Judicial Popular Constitutionalism Isn't Judicial Restraint 
In its simplest form, judicial popular constitutionalism could 
call upon judges to defer to the elected branches when resolving 
constitutional questions, therefore channeling constitutional 
deliberation back towards democratic politics. 35 And, indeed, 
some scholars have suggested as much. 36 Of course, this approach 
has a deep historical pedigree, linking back to legal giants like 
James Bradley Thayer and Felix Frankfurter. 37 This alone may 
make it appealing to some. Nevertheless, if the central goal of 
popular constitutionalism is to promote popular sovereignty, 
judicial restraint simply won't do. 
Ackerman was onto this issue decades ago. Indeed, his entire 
theory of dualist democracy is aimed at addressing the famed 
countermajoritarian difficulty. And in typical fashion, Ackerman 
turns this alleged difficulty on its head. Rather than viewing 
judicial review as a "deviant institution in the American 
democracy," 3~ Ackerman presents it as an important agent of 
popular sovereignty. 39 Recent scholarship reinforces these 
insights, confirming both the democratic shortcomings of our 
elected branches and the democratic promise of judicial review. 
Many factors make it difficult for the President and Congress 
to secure transformative legislation that matches majoritarian 
ACKERMAN, FouNDATIONS, supra note 3, at 6. For Ackerman, "during normal politics, 
the People simply do not exist."' /d. at 263. And, on certain occasions, judges arc called 
upon to check the actions of elected officials acting without a genuine popular mandate. 
35. See Snyder, supra note K, at 350. 
36. See, e.g., Snyder, supra note K, at 347-50; Brad Snyder, The Former Clerks Who 
Nearly Killed Judicial Restraint, K9 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2129,2151-52 (2014). 
37. See Timothy P. O'Neill, Harlan on My Mind: Chief Justice Roberts and the 
Affordable Care Act, 3 CAL. L. REV. CIR. 170, 172-73 (2012);; Snyder, supra note K, at 345, 
367; Snyder, supra note 36, at 2130, 2133. 
3K. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME 
COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 1 K (1962). 
39. See ACKERMAN, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 3, at 6, 17, 192, 2K9. 
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preferences. These factors include our divided system of 
government, our hyperpolarized parties, the committee system, 
the filibuster, special-interest groups, and the insulation of 
incumbents. 40 The end result is a political system that's often 
dominated by partisan pandering, with insulated incumbents 
courting base voters who are largely out of step with the wider 
public's views, and legislative gridlock, with our major parties 
unwilling to compromise on proposals, both big and small. 41 At 
the same time, an avalanche of recent scholarship confirms that 
judicial review- though driven by unelected judges- often 
promotes majoritarian preferences, with constitutional doctrine 
often tracking public opinion, especially on high-salience issues.42 
The Supreme Court's recent decision in United States v. Windsor 
is a prime example, with the Court enforcing majoritarian 
preferences and effectively repealing an unpopular law, above 
and beyond the contrary wishes of many Members of Congress. 
Of course, there are influential scholars associated with 
popular constitutionalism (like Mark Tushnet and Jeremy 
Waldron) who want to take the Constitution out of the courts 
altogether. 43 For these pioneering scholars, any form of judicial 
popular constitutionalism beyond simple judicial restraint is an 
obvious non-starter. However, even radical court skeptics like 
Larry Kramer reserve a key role for the courts in a robust system 
of popular constitutionalism. And this should come as no surprise. 
Consistent with Kramer's account, popular constitutionalism 
is committed, not to an anti-court outlook, but instead to giving 
life to the considered views of the American people- full stop. 
Sometimes this will happen through the political process. 
However, other times the best vehicle for translating these views 
into concrete constitutional action is the judiciary. 
40. See Hasen, supra note 2l), at l)lJ2-lJ3; Corinna Barrett Lain, Upside-Down Judicial 
Review, 101 GEO. L.J. 113, 15, 14X-52 (2012). 
41. See Hasen, supra note 2l), at l)lJ2-lJ3; Lain, supra note 40, at 152-53. 
42. See, e.g., BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF TilE PEOPLE: HOW PUBLIC OPINION 
HAS INFLUENCED TI IE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE 
CONSTITUTION (200l)); Lain, supra note 40. 
43. See MARK TUSIINET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM TilE COURTS 
(2000); Jeremy Waldron, The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review, 115 YALE L.J. 1346 
(2006). 
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2. Judicial Popular Constitutionalism Isn't Living 
Constitutionalism 
555 
There's no use denying that judicial popular 
constitutionalism bears a resemblance to living constitutionalism. 
Both theories argue that contemporary values should influence 
constitutional meaning, and both rely upon judges to help realize 
this goal. Nevertheless, judicial popular constitutionalism isn't 
simply living constitutionalism with a flashy new label. To see 
why, let's turn first to the traditional account of living 
constitutionalism. 
Living constitutionalists are a methodologically eclectic 
bunch, relying upon all of the traditional modalities of 
constitutional interpretation (e.g., text, history, structure, 
doctrine, and prudence),44 as well as each interpreter's own sense 
of fairness and good social policy, to ensure that the Constitution 
"keep[s] in touch with contemporary values"45 and "adapts to 
changing times and conditions."46 The living constitutionalist's 
ultimate goal is to "update and affirm" the meaning of the 
Constitution's text in a way that presents a normatively attractive 
vision for this generation of Americans. 47 
Because of this amorphous goal and the theory's 
methodological flexibility, critics have long attacked living 
constitutionalism as barely a theory at all, describing it as more of 
a loose metaphor, licensing judges to read their own views into 
the Constitution. 4x While this criticism may fairly apply to certain 
accounts of living constitutionalism, theorists like David Strauss 
have managed to develop sophisticated versions of the theory that 
conform with current judicial practice and, in turn, constrain 
judicial discretion. 49 However, even in Strauss's famous account 
of common law constitutional interpretation, judges-with their 
44. See William J. Brennan, Jr., The Constitution of the United States: Contemporary 
Ratification, 27 S. TEX. L. REV. 433,437 (1l)X6); Ethan J. Lcih, The Perpetual Anxiety of 
Living Constitutionalism, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 353, 35X (2007). 
45. Rohcrt Post & Rcva Siegel, Originalism as a Political Practice: The Right's ljving 
Constitution, 75 FORDHAM. L. REV. 545, 56l) (2006). 
46. BALKIN, supra note 26, at 277. 
47. Lcih, supra note 44, at 35l). 
4K See Bruce Ackerman, The Living Constitution, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1737, 1755 
(2007) !hereinafter Ackerman, Living!; BALKIN, supra note 26, at 277; William H. 
Rchnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEX. L. REV. 6l)3. 6l)3 (1l)76 ); 
WILKINSON, supra note 33, at 11. 
4l). See David A. Strauss, Common l~aw Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. 
REV. X77 (1l)%) I hereinafter Strauss, Constitutional Interpretation I; STRAUSS, supra note 
32; David A. Strauss, The Irrelevance of Constitutional Amendments, 114 HARV. L. REV. 
1457 (2001). 
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reliance upon judicial precedent, legal craft, and sound 
judgment-still take center stage. And, importantly, when on-
point precedent fails to settle a given constitutional dispute 
(which is often the case), it's the judge who ultimately "decide[s] 
what to do," "often ... on the basis of her views about which 
decision will be more fair or is more in keeping with good social 
policy. " 50 This is a defensible constitutional vision. However, it's 
not judicial popular constitutionalism. 
Rather than following her own constitutional wisdom, the 
popular constitutionalist judge must commit herself to the 
difficult task of identifying the public's considered views 
whenever possible and translating them into constitutional 
doctrine. 51 This approach constrains judges by actually forcing 
them to ground their analyses in concrete indicators of public 
opinion52 -not vague impressions of the "evolving''' constitutional 
understandings of the American people or an individual judge's 
own sense of fairness and sound policy. In other words, judicial 
popular constitutionalism -like Ackermanian constitutional 
interpretation- offers the possibility of a genuinely principled, 
constrained form of living constitutionalism. 
C. MAKING JUDICIAL POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM WORK: 
IDENTIFYING WHEN THE AMERICAN PEOPLE HAVE SPOKEN 
Contrary to a strong form of Thayerian judicial restraint, the 
popular constitutionalist judge may exercise judicial review to 
help realize the constitutional views of the American people. And 
contrary to the traditional account of living constitutionalism, she 
must actually seek out those views by identifying objective indicia 
of public opinion. For the committed popular constitutionalist, 
the key question is always whether the American people have 
reached a considered judgment about a given constitutional issue. 
During periods of heightened constitutional engagement- in 
other words, periods like Ackerman's constitutional moments-
this question is relatively easy to answer, and for precisely the 
reasons Ackerman states. However, at other tirnes, a popular 
constitutionalist judge may be inclined to look beyond the 
traditional patterns of constitutional change that Ackerman 
outlines and, in turn, recognize other examples of public 
constitutional consensus. The challenge for the popular 
50. STRAUSS, supra note 32, at 3X. 
51. See Ackerman, Uving, supra note 4X, at 1755. 
52. !d. at I XOI. 
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constitutionalist scholar is to be able to provide that judge with 
the methodological tools necessary to identify when the American 
people have reached a considered judgment-tools that are, at 
once, more flexible than Ackerman's rule of recognition, yet still 
stringent enough to avoid mere judicial policy-making. This is no 
easy task. 53 
In this Section, I catalogue various indicators of public 
opinion available to the committed popular constitutionalist, 
drawing upon insights from Ackerman's new volume throughout. 
These are the building blocks of powerful popular constitutional 
arguments, available alone or in combination to help judges 
determine whether the American people have reached a 
considered judgment about a given constitutional issue. All told, 
the popular constitutionalist judge may probe at least five distinct 
indicators of public opinion. 
First, she may look to a variety of actions and activities 
associated with the President (p. 69). 54 Echoing Ackerman's 
account, she may consider a President's claim to a popular 
mandate following a critical election (p. 223). She may study a 
President's use of the bully pulpit to advance his constitutional 
vision (p. 7). And, most importantly, she may analyze any 
concrete actions taken by the President to make that vision a 
reality, including any coordination with Congress on key 
legislation ff· 1 00), any argu~ents ~dvanced by the ~r~side~t's 
legal team, .. and any supportive actions taken by adm1mstrat1ve 
agencies (pp. 69, 1 06). 56 
Concededly, when considered in isolation, these factors may 
say relatively little about the constitutional views of the wider 
public. Indeed, a President's electoral victory, as well as his 
various words and deeds while in office, may simply reflect the 
constitutional vision-or even bare policy preferences-of a 
single political party. However, when considered in tandem with 
other elements of the constitutional regime, these presidential 
53. See Lain, supra note 40, at 117, 11 ~; Snyder, supra note ~' at 373; Strauss, 
Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 49, at 929. 
54. See also WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR. & JOliN FEREJOIIN, A REPUBLIC OF 
STATUTES: THE NEW AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 16 (2010); Jedediah Purdy, Presidential 
Popular Constitutionalism, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 1~37, 1~37-40 (2009). 
55. See, e.g., Snyder, supra note ~' at 3~3, 416 (detailing the Eisenhower 
Administration's support for the NAACP in the Brown litigation). 
56. See also ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, supra note 54, at 16 (noting the importance of 
administrative constitutionalism). 
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indicators may serve as a sturdy foundation for a broad, 
compelling popular constitutional argument. 57 
Second, a popular constitutionalist judge naay look to a 
variety of actions and activities associated with Congress (pp. 8-
9). sH She may scrutinize a congressional party's claim to an 
electoral mandate following a wave election. slJ She may examine 
the text and principles embodied in landmark statutes (p. 100).60 
She may look for any larger r,atterns in congressionallawmaking61 
(pp. 150-151) and practice. 6 She may study the legislative history 
leading to the enactment of key statutes, including notable 
speeches delivered by congressional leaders (pp. 150-51).63 And 
she may consider the legal arguments advanced by key Members 
of Congress in court, including in amicus briefs filed in important 
constitutional cases. 64 
Once again, these factors-considered in isolation-may do 
little to aid the popular constitutionalist judge. Congressional 
elections rarely capture the public's attention, and congressional 
leaders rarely build a following that extends far beyond their own 
57. Ackerman provides a great example in his analysis of Justice William Johnson's 
landmark decision in United States v. Hudson & Goodwin. See BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE 
FAILURE OF THE FOUNDINCi FATHERS: JEFFERSON, MJ\RSIIJ\LL, AND THE RISE OF 
PRESIDENTIAL DEMOCRACY 224-40 (2005). There, the Jeffcrson··appointcd Johnson 
declared common-law crimes unconstitutional hascd, in part, on ·'settled ... puhlic 
opinion," Hudson & Uoodwin, 11 lJ .S. 32, 32 (1 H 12)-"settled" presumahly hy a series of 
Jeffersonian electoral victories that allowed Johnson to write key Jeffersonian principles 
into early constitutional doctrine. 
5K See also ESKRIDGE & FEREJOHN, supra note 54, at 16; Amar, supra note 30, at 
1752; Rohcrt C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Legislative Constitutionalism and Section Five 
Power: Policentric Interpretation of the Family and Medical Leave Act, 112 YALE L.J. 1943, 
19H5-H6 (2003) !hereinafter Post & Siegel, Policentricj; Rohcrt C. Po:~t & Rcva B. Siegel, 
Protecting the Constitution from the People: 1 uricentric Restrictions on Section Five Power, 
7H IND. L.J. 1, 2 (2003) jhcrcinalkr Post & Siegel, Juricentricj. 
59. See, e.g., ACKERMAN, TRANSFORMATIONS, supra note 10, at 160-207 (examining 
the Repuhlican Party's mandate after the congressional elections of 1 :~66 ). 
60. See also Rohcrt C. Post. Foreword: Fashioning the Legal Constitution: Culture, 
Courts, and I.aw, 117 HJ\RV. L. REV. 4, 41 (2003) (examining various landmark statutes 
along similar lines); Post & Siegel, Juricentric, supra note 5H, at 2, 14, 30-34 (same). C). 
Katzcnhach v. Morgan, 3H4 U.S. 641, 654-56 (1966) (applying an an(:Jiysis that resemhlcs 
this approach). 
61. See also Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 6H7-HH (1973) (examining the 
flurry of statutes passed in the 1960s and 1970s addressing gender discrimination); Post & 
Siegel, Juricentric, supra note 5H, at 32. 
62. See, e.g., Town of Greece v. Galloway, No. 12-696, slip op. at 10 (U.S. May 5, 
2014) (using Congress's longstanding usc of legislative prayer to justify the practice's 
constitutionality at the locallcvcl). 
63. Cf South Carolina v. Kdtzenhach, 3H3 U.S. 301, 30X-09, 315 (1966) (relying upon 
legislative history as part of a larger constitutional argument). 
64. See, e.g., McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 7H9 (2010) (relying, in part, 
on an amicus hricf signed hy Memhers of Congress to support an individual rights reading 
of the Second Amendment). 
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constituents. Furthermore, as a multimember, multi-chamber 
body, Congress rarely takes actions that advance a unitary 
constitutional vision. Nevertheless, these congressional indicators 
may still serve as key elements in broader popular constitutional 
arguments. Indeed, congressional constitutional arguments are 
perhaps most compelling when they help to show that the House, 
the Senate, and the President have all united behind a single 
constitutional vision (pp. 99-116, 149-151 ). h) 
Third, the popular constitutionalist judge may study the 
contours of public debates over high-salience constitutional issues 
and search for any evidence of constitutional convergence. This is 
a key theme of Reva Siegel's scholarship,h6 as well as an important 
component of Ackerman's rule of recognition (p. 6). 
Nevertheless, it requires a bit of explanation. 
Constitutional issues that draw genuine public interest (like 
marriage equality, abortion, and gun rights) often inspire large-
scale social movement activism, as well as mobilization by major 
political parties. Predictably, these issues often split us along both 
ideological and partisan lines, with increased activities on one side 
of a debate frequently leading to backlash by opposing activists. 67 
Social movement conflict often deepens the divisions between the 
opposing sides; however, that's not all that it does-and this is 
Siegel's key insight. These patterns of mobilization and backlash 
often also spur widespread public deliberation- deliberation that 
extends beyond the activist community and engages the general 
public. To win this broader debate, each side must then come to 
terms with its opponents' strongest arguments, often co-opting 
parts of them in an attempt to stake out a position that appeals to 
the wider public. 6H Over time, this dynamic may lead the two sides 
to converge over certain constitutional baselines. 69 For the 
popular constitutionalist judge, this convergence may signal broad 
65. Ackerman provides valuahlc models in his rewrites of Heart of Atlanta Motel, 
Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1%4), and Harper v. Virginia Board of Flections, 3X3 
U.S. 663 (1%6), in his new volume. 
66. See Reva B. Siegel, Dead or Alive: Originalism as Popular Constitutionalism in 
Heller, 122 HARV. L. REV. 191 (200X) [hereinafter Siegel, Dead or Alive[; Reva B. Siegel, 
Text in Contest: Gender and the Constitution from a Social Movement Perspective, 150 lJ. 
PA. L. REV. 297 (20()1) [hereinafter Siegel, Text in Contest[. 
67. See Reva B. Siegel, Constitutional Culture, Social Movement Conflict, and 
Constitutional Change: The Case of the De Facto ERA, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1323, 1362--63 
(2006 ). 
6X. !d. at 1330-31. 
69. Siegel, Dead or Alive, supra note 66, at 193-94 ( descrihing the constitutional 
convergence hetween feminists and social conservatives on a gender equality reading of 
the Equal Protection Clause in the 1970s). 
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public consensus- a consensus that's worthy of codification in 
constitutional doctrine. 70 
Of course, constitutional convergence isn't the only pattern 
of interest to the popular constitutionalist judge. For instance, 
while studying the dynamics around a certain conflict, she may 
discover evidence of key defections from one side's coalition, 
possibly signaling a crumbling consensus on one side of the 
debate. 71 Alternatively, she may find evidence of large-sale 
acquiescence by one of our major political parties-- or, at least, by 
a critical mass of its mainstream leaders- therefore signaling a 
certain issue's demise as a flashpoint of large-scale constitutional 
conflict between our major parties. 72 Regardless, by tending to the 
contours of these public debates (including any evidence of social 
movement activism, political mobilization, and public 
deliberation), the popular constitutionalist judge may gain key 
insights about both the breadth and depth of public support for a 
given constitutional position-key elements of any successful 
popular constitutional argument. 73 
Fourth, the popular constitutionalist judge may look to 
actions and activities taken at the state and local level. 74 This is 
already a well-established part of current judicial practice and, 
therefore, requires relatively little explanation. 75 For instance, the 
popular constitutionalist judge may examine the rights enshrined 
70. We sec examples of such convergence during the struggle over women's rights in 
the 1970s and the hattie over gun rights in the 2000s. See Rcva B. Siegel, Heller & 
Originalism's Dead /Iand-In Theory and Practice, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1399, 1414 (2009); 
Siegel, Text in Contest, supra note 66, at 30X-13. In hoth of these instances, the Supreme 
Court codified the areas of constitutional convergence in landmark decisions. See Siegel, 
supra note 70, at 1414; Siegel, supra note 67, at 1331,1406. 
71. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 55X, 576 (2003) (using "suhstantial and 
continuing" criticism of Bowers hy notahlc conservatives like Charles Fried and Richard 
Posner to gesture towards a growing hipartisan consensus against laws criminalizing same-
sex sodomy). Similarly, a popular constitutionalist judge could look at conservative 
defections on marriage equality, including cstahlishmcnt Rcpuhlicans like Jon Huntsman 
and Ted Olsen. 
72. See, e.g., ACKERMAN, TRANSf<'ORMATIONS, supra note 10, at355-X2 (explaining 
how the post-New Deal Rcpuhlican Party came to terms with the constitutionality of the 
New Deal usc of federal power). 
73. See Ackerman, De-Schooling, supra note 13, at 3110. 
74. See AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA'S lJNWRI'ITEN CONSTITUTION: THE 
PRECEDENTS AND PRINCIPLES WE LIVE BY 97 (2012). 
75. See, e.g., Corinna Barrett Lain, The Unexceptionalism of "F:volving Standards," 
57 UCLA L. REV. 365, 367-6X, 375--405 (2009) (noting that the analysis of state-level action 
is used not only in the Eighth Amendment and suhstantivc due process contexts, hut also 
on a range of other issues, including procedural due process, equal protection, religious 
lihcrty, free speech, Fourth Amendment "reasonahlcncss," and takings). 
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in state constitutions,76 state and local participation in 
constitutional litigation, 77 the enforcement (or non-enforcement) 
patterns of state and local law enforcement,7il and the everyda~ 
practices of ordinary Americans and their key institutions. 9 
Furthermore, and most familiar of all, she may look to any related 
state laws on the books, using the widely accepted method of 
state-legislation-counting to support a given construction of a 
vague piece of constitutional text (e.g., "cruel and unusual 
punishment"),ilo recognize a new unenumerated right as 
fundamental (e.g., the right to privacy),il1 or incorporate a 
provision of the Bill of Rights against the states (e.g., the Second 
Amendment).il2 
Of course, state legislation is often a poor proxy for public 
opinion- for instance, when old, unrepresentative laws sit on the 
books or when public opinion is changing rapidly.il3 Nevertheless, 
a state legislation count may serve as a useful component of a 
76. See, e.g., McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742,769 (2010) (relying, in part, 
on state constitutional provisions to incorporate the Second Amendment against the 
states); Steven G. Calahresi & Sarah E. Agudo, Individual Rights Under State Constitutions 
When the Fourteenth Amendment Was Rat~fied in 1868: What Rights Are Deeply Rooted in 
American History and Tradition?, 't/.7 TEX. L. REV. 7 (200X); Joshua A Douglas, The Right 
to Vote Under State Constitutions, 67 VAND. L. REV. X9 (2014); Barry Friedman & Sara 
Solow, The Federal Right to an Adequate Education, Xl GEO. WASH. L. REV. 92 (2013). 
77. See, e.g., McDonald, 561 U.S. at 7'tl.9 (2010) (relying, in part, on an amicus "hricf 
submitted hy 3X States" to incorporate the Second Amendment against the states); Joseph 
Blocher, Popular Constitutionalism and the State Attorneys General, 122 HARV. L. REV. F. 
lOX, lOX (2011). 
7K See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 55X, 569-70, 573 (2003) (relying, in part, on 
state and local non-enforcement of sodomy laws to strike down a Texas law criminalizing 
same-sex sodomy). 
79. See, e.g., Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1X11, lXlX-20 (2014) (looking 
to the practice of legislative prayer in state legislatures to uphold the practice at a local 
town hoard meeting); Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 42X, 443 (2000) (upholding 
Miranda hased, in part, on the fact that the decision "has hecome emhedded in routine 
police practice to the point where the warnings have hecome part of our national culture"); 
Amar, supra note 30, at 1750, 1755 (noting that the right to counsel for all felony 
defendants "was already settled practice in every federal court and in forty-five of the 
states" hcfore Gideon). 
XO. See, e.g., Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 19X6, 1996--9X (2014); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 
U.S. 304,307,310-17 (2002); see also Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473,2497 (2014) (Ali to, 
J., concurring) (noting that the "reasonableness" of a warrantless search of an arrestee's 
cell phone under the Fourth Amendment may he informed hy legislation passed hy state 
legislatures). 
Xl. See, e.g., Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 570--73 (striking down a Texas law criminalizing 
same-sex sodomy); Washington v. Glucksherg, 521 U.S. 702, 719, 723 (1997) (rejecting a 
constitutional right to die). The Ninth Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment's 
Privileges or Immunities Clause may authorize such an inquiry. Amar, supra note 30, at 
1762--63. 
X2. See Lain, supra note 75, at 367-6X, 375--405. 
X3. !d. at 404; Lain, supra note 40, at 173. 
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broader popular constitutional argument- as may state 
constitutional consensus, widespread state and local involvement 
in constitutional litigation, clear patterns in state and local law 
enforcement, and well-settled practices by ordinary citizens and 
their key institutions. 
Fifth, the popular constitutionalist judge allso has at her 
disposal a quantitative means of approximating when the 
American public has reached a constitutional consensus-the 
public opinion poll. x4 Recent polls may offer her a snapshot of 
public opinion at a given moment. And tracking polls may provide 
her with a sense of the public's views over time. Both pieces of 
information may be valuable when assessing the breadth and 
depth of the public's views on a given issue. Nevertheless, the 
popular constitutionalist judge should approach public opinion 
data with the appropriate level of caution. 
For instance, she should be skeptical of a single snapshot 
offered by a single poll on a given issue. xs Furthermore, she should 
remain attentive to concerns about polling methodology like 
poorly worded questions.x6 Finally, even a properly constructed 
(and administered) poll leaves open certain questions about 
whether the survey results represent the considered judgments of 
the American people or just a shallow snapshot of public 
opinion.x7 However, the popular constitutionalist judge shouldn't 
ignore consistent results in several polls showing public consensus 
on a given issue.xx Those consensus views-especially when 
sustained over a period of time and reinforced by other evidence 
of public engagement- should be a part of her decisionmaking 
calculus. x<J 
In the end, no single indicator of public opinion is perfect. 
However, collectively, the indicators outlined in this Section are 
intended to help the popular constitutionalist judge determine 
when the American people have reached a considered judgment 
about a given constitutional issue. Furthermore, even for a judge 
X4. To date, the Supreme Court's lengthiest discussion of puhlic opinion polling was 
in Atkins, 536 U.S. 304. 
X5. See Strauss, supra note 31, at X63. 
X6. See BRUCE ACKERMAN & JAMES S. FISHKIN, DELIBERATION DAY 7 (2004); 
Lain, supra note 40, at 117, 11X; Benjamin J. Roesch, Crowd Control: The Majoritarian 
Court and the Reflection of Public Opinion in Doctrine, 39 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 379, 420 
(2006). 
X7. See Roesch, supra note X6, at 404. 
XR Cf Primus, supra note 15, at 1227 (arguing that "stahlc puhlic consensus, not 
shifting majority preference," may guide constitutional decisionmaking). 
X9. See Lain, supra note 40, at 121, 135. 
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who isn't a full-blooded popular constitutionalist, these indicators 
may help supplement the traditional tools of constitutional 
analysis or, alternatively, provide a fresh way of thinking about 
the analytical tools that she's already using. 90 
III. PUTTING IT ALL TOGETHER: A QUICK LOOK AT 
MARRIAGE EQUALITY 
Popular constitutionalists seeking to construct powerful 
popular constitutional arguments will draw upon several 
indicators of public opinion and take full account of the various 
contours of the current constitutional regime (p. 2).l)1 This type of 
analysis will help not only to identify the considered judgments of 
the American people, but also to assess their depth and stability. 
To see how this approach might work, I conclude by turning to 
the issue of marriage equality. In particular, I contrast 
Ackerman's treatment of this issue with a plausible application of 
judicial popular constitutionalism. While both approaches seek to 
keep faith with principles endorsed by the American people, their 
respective reference points differ, as do the roles that they each 
reserve for individual judges. 
For Ackerman, the issue of marriage equality calls for an 
application of Brown's anti-humiliation principle (pp. 307-310). 
While judges initially limit the reach of a new constitutional 
revolution to its core applications- for instance, in the case of 
Brown and the Civil Rights Revolution, the anti-humiliation 
principle to the question of race in our public schools- it is up to 
future judges to extend each revolution's core principles to new 
factual contexts, moving from (what Ackerman calls) 
particularistic synthesis to comprehensive synthesis.l)2 
For instance, consider a legal challenge to a state's same-sex 
marriage ban. In this context, it's up to the Ackermanian judge to 
apply her own independent judgment- her own "situation-
sense"- to this new set of facts and determine whether the state 
ban violates Brown's anti-humiliation principle (pp. 131-132, 308). 
If the answer is yes, then the ban must fall. If the answer is no, 
then it may stand. In short, the answer lies in principles endorsed 
90. See, e.g., Shdhy County v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2o12, 2o32-2o52 (2013) (Ginshurg, 
J., dissenting) (using a story of sustained, hipartisan consensus to critique Chid Justice 
Rohcrts's majority opinion striking down a key component of the Voting Rights Act). 
91. For good examples of this type of analysis, sec Rosen & Schmidt, supra note H, at 
129-31; Snyder, supra note X, at 410---17; Lain, supra note 40, at 121-25; Sunstcin, supra 
note 33, at 2oo-71. 
92. See ACKERMAN, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 3, at Y4--9X. 
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by the American people decades ago and a twenty-first century 
judge's common-sense application of those principles to new 
contexts (p. 308). 
To be clear, I don't want to exaggerate either the magnitude 
of the dead-hand problem or the amount of judicial discretion 
permitted in Ackerman's account. While the anti-humiliation 
principle is a product of the 1950s and 1960s, each judge's 
situation-sense-the very engine of comprehensive synthesis-
will be shaped by today's societal attitudes (pp. 131-132, 308). 
Furthermore, each judge is tasked with uncovering the original 
understanding of each constitutional revolution and applying its 
principles-not each judge's own preferred principles (p. 329). 
Therefore, in Ackerman's account, old principles are mediated by 
contemporary values, and each judge's policy preferences are 
tempered by well-established constitutional principles. 
Nevertheless, for Ackerman, the answer does ultimately lay in 
each judge's independent conclusion- her own attempt to keep 
faith with the constitutional tradition -not that judge's 
assessment of contemporary public opinion. This is, of course, in 
contrast with judicial popular constitutionalism. 
For the popular constitutionalist judge, conternporary public 
opinion is a key (and explicit) part of her decisionmaking calculus, 
as she seeks to use the various tools at her disposal to reach a 
textured understanding of the public's views on a given issue. Of 
course, she will turn first to the text, history, and principles 
enshrined in the Constitution. However, if she determines that 
those sources are inconclusive, she will then seek to understand 
the contours of public opinion. When analyzing the issue of 
marriage equality, the popular constitutionalist judge might begin 
by noting that this issue has been the topic of sustained public 
debate for over a decade-in elections, in the hal1s of Congress, 
in state and local legislative bodies, and at various kitchen tables, 
water coolers, and neighborhood barbecues throughout the 
nation. Therefore, any public views on marriage equality-
whether offered by public figures or evident in public opinion 
polls-are likely to represent well thought-out positions rather 
than unreflective snapshots. 
From there, the popular constitutionalist judge might then 
work her way through the various indicators of public opinion. 
For instance, she might first turn to public opinion polls to assess 
the public's current views on the issue, as well as to note any 
related trends. If so, she will have a number of polls from which 
to draw, as marriage equality has been the subject of endless 
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polling since the issue was first placed on the public agenda over 
a decade ago. She might then turn to any actions and activities 
associated with the President, including President Obama's public 
endorsement of marriage equality before the 2012 election, the 
Department of Justice's refusal to defend the federal Defense of 
Marriage Act in court, its participation in Obergefell v. Hodges 
this Term, and any actions taken by administrative agencies to 
promote LGBT rights. She might then examine any related 
legislation at the federal, state, and local level, cataloguing any 
state and local laws on the books and noting any patterns (or lack 
thereof) in congressional lawmaking. She might also examine the 
litigation decisions made by state attorneys general, as well as 
federal, state, and local lawmakers, in various marriage-equality 
cases. Finally, she might look for any evidence of bipartisan, cross-
ideological support for (or opposition to) marriage equality. 
Of course, different popular constitutionalists may reach 
different conclusions based on these indicators. For instance, 
some popular constitutionalists may choose to strike down same-
sex marriage bans, leaning heavily on evidence of majority 
support for marriage equality and a clear trend continuing in that 
direction. Others may reach the same conclusion, but instead 
emphasize the crumbling consensus against marriage equality, 
with former marriage-equality opponents- including leading 
Democratic politicians (like President Obama) and establishment 
Republicans (like Jon Huntsman)-now expressing support for 
the idea, and public opinion polls showing a diminishing minority 
opposing it. When there was a strong consensus against marriage 
equality, these popular constitutionalists may have been inclined 
to uphold laws prohibiting same-sex marriage. However, now that 
such a consensus has dissolved, they may feel freer to use the 
trend in favor of marriage equality and other tools of 
constitutional analysis to strike down same-sex marriage bans. 93 
Of course, other popular constitutionalists may look at the 
same indicators and conclude that marriage equality is still an area 
of ongoing conflict where neither side has secured a sustained 
constitutional consensus. Therefore, at least for now, they may be 
inclined to defer to the elected branches and permit a variety of 
approaches to marriage in the states. Finally, still others may view 
constitutional equality as an area (like free speech) that should 
fall outside of the domain of popular constitutional analysis 
altogether and, therefore, decide to apply other methods to the 
93. See Primus, supra note 15, at 122H. 
566 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 30:541 
issue. Regardless of the conclusion drawn by any individual 
interpreter, the indicators of public opinion outlined here provide 
the popular constitutionalist judge with the methodological tools 
necessary to analyze important constitutional issues. 
CONCLUSION 
Bruce Ackerman's We the People: The Civil Rights 
Revolution is a rich, textured, engrossing account of one of the 
most important periods in American history. However, it's also a 
call to action for lawyers to finally place the American people-
and not just the Supreme Court and our mythical Founders-at 
the center of our constitutional story. 
Answering Ackerman's call, I've used this review of his new 
volume to offer a preliminary account of judicial popular 
constitutionalism. While a detailed description of this approach is 
beyond the scope of this Book Review, I hope that this account is 
of some use to those interested 1n making popular 
constitutionalism work. 
